An agent network boundary permits the destinations and operations required by the accepted task, records every attempt, and blocks new destinations until the buyer reviews them.
Map destinations to task requirements
List each domain, API, repository host, package registry, model endpoint, webhook, and internal service the accepted tasks require, including protocol, port, identity, and data class. Define the unit of work, the people and systems involved, the evidence already available, and the exact decision this record must support. A narrow boundary keeps the analysis tied to an observable process instead of turning it into an open-ended inventory.
NIST zero-trust guidance treats access as a policy decision around a specific resource, while OWASP identifies excessive functionality and permissions as an agent risk. Preserve the source URL, version, retrieval date, and relevant rule beside the local implementation decision. If the source does not address the buyer's environment directly, label the local conclusion as an adaptation and retain the assumption that connects them.
Enforce egress and consent
Record the normalized destination, resolved address, task identity, requested operation, payload class, decision, consent event, response identifier, and denial reason. Each record needs a stable identifier, owner, current state, source reference, last verified time, exception path, and next permitted action. Conflicting or missing evidence remains visible so a later reviewer can distinguish a confirmed result from inference, recollection, or an unavailable signal.
Static required destinations may be preapproved, while new hosts, sensitive payloads, destructive operations, and ambiguous redirects should enter a buyer-controlled hold. Write the decision rule before automating it, including who may approve, what evidence is required, which condition causes a hold, and how an exception expires. This makes the control testable and prevents a tool from quietly expanding its own authority.
Test bypass and outage behavior
Exercise alternate DNS, redirects, raw IP addresses, package downloads, metadata endpoints, tunneling attempts, unavailable proxies, denied destinations, and emergency isolation. Record the fixture, versions, environment, expected result, actual result, reviewer, and corrective action for every failed case. Rerun the accepted cases after a source, permission, workflow, or dependency changes so an old passing result is not presented as current evidence.
Agent Access and Secret Boundary Implementation is operated by Reality Contact, LLC. The buyer owns security policy, credentials, lawful use, and production authorization; Reality Contact, LLC implements and tests only the accepted task boundary. The resulting guide and implementation evidence cover only the named sources, workflow, versions, and acceptance cases, so the buyer retains authority over policy, credentials, production use, and later changes.
Where the service stops
Reality Contact, LLC implements bounded controls but does not certify security, approve production access, own credentials, choose lawful data use, conduct a broad penetration test, respond to incidents, or administer access indefinitely. The buyer approves tasks, roles, tools, network destinations, secret owners, consent conditions, production credentials, residual risks, and the final authorization. This is technical security implementation; it does not replace professional security, privacy, legal, compliance, penetration-testing, or production review. The controls do not promise containment against untested vulnerabilities, correct downstream authorization, absence of every secret, or protection outside the accepted tasks and environments.
Sources: NIST Zero Trust Architecture; OWASP guidance on excessive agency.